This type of damages also covers the period preceding and following the trial. However, because it is greatly subjective and difficult to assess, the award is known as general damages notwithstanding that it relates to the pre or post-trial period. It seeks to provide solace to the victim whose lifestyle and quality of life may have been shattered by the injuries. For example, a skydiving rock-climbing daredevil will likely have to adjust his or her lifestyle when confined to a wheelchair. Although he or she may be able to find alternatives, his or her adventurous spirit may suffer greatly as a result of a wrongdoing. The inevitable question is how to adequately compensate what may be a drastic change in a lifestyle?
It is generally accepted that an accident with little effect on a person’s lifestyle will not warrant as great a compensatory award as one at the other end of the spectrum. However, because of the subjective nature of the matters involved, this type of damages could fluctuate considerably between individuals suffering from relatively similar injuries. “Pain and suffering and loss of amenities are intangibles. They are not possessions that have an objective, ascertainable value”: Lindal, supra p 635. It is to address such concerns that the Supreme Court of Canada, in Andrews, supra pp 261-262, adopted the functional approach to awards of non-pecuniary damages:
But the problem here is qualitatively different from that of pecuniary losses. There is no medium of exchange for happiness. There is no market for expectation of life. The monetary evaluation of non-pecuniary losses is a philosophical and policy exercise more than a legal or logical one. The award must be fair and reasonable, fairness being gauged by earlier decisions; but the award must also of necessity be arbitrary or conventional. No money can provide true restitution. […][…] The sheer fact is that there is no objective yardstick for translating non-pecuniary losses, such as pain and suffering and loss of amenities, into monetary terms. This area is open to widely extravagant claims. It is in this area that awards in the United States have soared to dramatically high levels in recent years. […][…] The third, or “functional” approach, accepts the personal premise of the second, but rather than attempting to set a value on lost happiness, it attempts to assess the compensation required to provide the injured person “with reasonable solace for his misfortune.” “Solace” in this sense is taken to mean physical arrangements which can make his life more endurable rather than “solace” in the sense of sympathy. To my mind, this last approach has much to commend it, as it provides a rationale as to why money is considered compensation for non-pecuniary losses such as loss of amenities, pain and suffering, and loss of expectation of life. Money is awarded because it will serve a useful function in making up for what has been lost in the only way possible, accepting that what has been lost is incapable of being replaced in any direct way.
Thus, the award of damages for non-pecuniary loss is to provide the victim with alternatives to the lost quality of life and lifestyle deriving from the wrongdoing. “Money is awarded, not because lost faculties have a dollar value, but because money can be used to substitute other enjoyments and pleasures for those that have been lost”: Lindal, supra p 634. While the skydiving rock-climbing daredevil may no longer be able to engage in his or her favorite activities, the damages are intended to allow him or her to explore other ways to fill the void left by the tortious act. The same principle applies to the chronic pain victim who can no longer enjoy long walks or road trips.
The inherent difficulties in assessing non-pecuniary losses led the Supreme Court to limit the amount that can be awarded under this head of damages. In Andrews, supra p 263-265, dealing with a severely injured young male, the bench set a ceiling of $100,000, but subject to ulterior adjustments for cost-of-living increases: see Lindal, supra pp 640-641 & 643. One of the important tenets of the limit rests on the premise that a victim has already been fully compensated for the other losses, like income, treatments and valuable services: Lindal, supra pp 637 & 639. Of course, the value of $100,000 has considerably eroded since 1978, and as directed courts have adjusted the value to account for cost-of-living increases, being worth around $400,000 nowadays.
The functional approach and limit have been confirmed in subsequent cases, namely in Lindal, supra.